

LONDON, APRIL 2, 1852.

The week has so far passed without an event worth recording so far as respects England, and also as regards Europe generally, if we except the assembling of the new French Legislature. And even this incident sinks into comparative insignificance, when we reflect upon the mode in which French affairs are at present managed; the absorption of all the powers of the State by the President becoming every day more complete and more absolute. LOUIS NAPOLEON is so fond of decree making that nothing of importance is, in fact, left for the Chambers to transact.

The proceedings in the British Parliament have been unimportant, excepting so far as they, not very dimly, shadow forth the future in the declarations of the most influential men, and indicate a complete remodelling of parties, and consequently a change of policy. We see little reason, however, to fear that the change, should it occur, will be from what in England we call Free Trade to Restriction, still less for the advantage of one class and the prejudice of the rest. There will be no impediments thrown in the way of steady careful progress, nor any retrograde or reactionary movement. There will be no illiberal tone adopted towards other nations; no injudicious interference attempted with other people; no breach in the peaceable relations of England with the entire world; no extension of all treaty obligations, and all international and humanizing courtesies with the whole human family; as earnest attention to all the interests of peace, economy, and salutary reform and improvement, and a sincere desire to give to the English people as much of rational liberty, and to each individual as large a participation in natural rights, as are compatible with the best interests of society and the maintenance of good government.

The principal business in the House of Lords has been the introduction of a bill by the Lord Chancellor relating to the execution of wills, and the passage of Lord Bacon's bill (through the upper House) for shortening the meeting for business of the succeeding one. Both these measures are of importance, and the earnestness with which they have been attended to shows the desire of the House of Lords not to unnecessarily prolong the existence of the present Parliament.

In the Commons, the Easter recess has been arranged to extend from Tuesday, the 6th instant, to Monday, the 19th. No doubt a great portion of the holidays will be spent in electioneering, and in visits of the members to their constituents. We have no idea that the result of the next election will be favorable to the protectionists, applying that term to the advocates of a duty on imported grain; on the contrary, we think the dubious and ambiguous answers given by Lord Derby and his friends to all questions upon the subject have dissipated a great number of those who only support them as the friends and advocates of that very measure. The debate upon the subject of Mr. HUME's annual motion in favor of Parliamentary reform, the result of which we stated in our last, has given rise to most copious newspaper comments.

On Monday night Mr. WALPOLE, the Home Secretary, moved to bring in a bill to amend and consolidate the laws respecting the militia. He explained the leading features of the scheme as follows:—  
"It is proposed to endeavor to raise the necessary force, not by compulsory but by voluntary enlistment. The number of men proposed is 80,000; but as it is not probable that so many can be procured in the first year, the number for that period is to be limited to 50,000. A bounty of £4 or £5, payable either in one sum or in monthly instalments, will be offered as an inducement to join the force. The age of the eligible to be from 18 to 35; the period of their enlistment being five years, and the time of training and discipline 21 days in the year, with power, in case of emergency, to extend the period to seven weeks, or reduce it to three days. The estimated expense is £250,000 a year, or in the first year £400,000. The expense to be borne by the national purse."

Leave was granted to bring in the bill under the preparation of Messrs. D'ISRAELI, WALPOLE, and BERNARD. It is not expected, however, that a measure involving such a complete subversion of the entire existing militia system of the country can be fully discussed and carried in the present Parliament, and a subsequent one will, most likely, dismiss it to that last receptacle of lost things, "the limbo of vanity."

On Tuesday Mr. H. BARKLEY brought forward his annual motion for the adoption of the ballot in elections to Parliament. The debate was favored with the attention of a larger number of members than were found in their seats on Mr. HUME's motion. All the old arguments pro and con were brought forward on the occasion; nothing new was said, probably because nothing new could be said, and the debate closed with a division, on which 144 voted for the motion, and 246 against it.

Nothing of importance in either House last night, or the night before.

If all the supplies can be granted, and the mutiny bill passed before the Easter recess, it is quite probable that Parliament will be dissolved during that vacation.

The following facts in relation to the public income and expenditure of the United Kingdom are stated on the authority of a lately printed Parliamentary paper. In 1822 the British revenue was £54,135,748, the expenditure £49,891,225; leaving a surplus of £4,744,518. This, we believe, is the largest surplus upon record, and led to a repeal and reduction of taxation to the amount of £2,189,101. The capital of the funded and unfunded debt was then £828,811,295. The balances in the exchequer at the close of the year were £7,797,020.

In 1851 the revenue proved to be £62,238,000, the expenditure £49,506,610—leaving a surplus of £2,726,396. The taxes were reduced £2,070,864. The capital of the debt was £782,869,382, and the balances in the exchequer at the close of the year were £8,381,637.

The returns of the Bank of England show an increase of £71,756 in bullion, and a decrease of £256,714 in circulation; consequently an increase of £282,870 in reserve, and it has, therefore, an unemployed capital of £1,765,910. The bullion in the Bank does not yet reach the equivalent of £20,000,000, being only £19,745,900. The circulation is £19,980,020, exclusive of £1,061,520 in seven days post bills. It is almost unnecessary to add that money is abundant and easy. The Bank will not, it is said, make any change in the rate of interest until after the elections; the condition of home politico-commercial affairs affects business, making it uncertain and stagnant. The gentlemen of the Bank appear to be understood to keep a watchful eye over events, and to be more guided by circumstances than fixed rules. We think they are right.

Recent Parliamentary returns show the total number of persons employed on railways in the United Kingdom, in the year 1851, to be 106,501, being 12,358 less than in 1850. The decrease was, of course, on railways in course of construction, as upon lines opened the number of employees had increased by 3,589.

In literature there is little that is new. There are long lists of new books advertised in the newspapers, but we do not now say which attract us particularly, either by their own titles or the names and fame of their authors.

The attention of the public has been called to the great quantity of that very subtle poison, *strychnine*, which has lately been imported from Paris. It turns out that this dangerous article is used in the manufacture of that now very fashionable variety of beverage called *bitter beer*. It is known that beer, made additionally bitter by the hop, chamomile, or gentian, is very wholesome, and materially assists the digestive organs. But the active principle of the *nux vomica*, scientifically known as *strychnine*, which is now discovered to be largely used in this manufacture, is highly dangerous; and, though the quantity used is of course small, this very subtle poison has what is called an accumulative action, and must, if long used, prove eminently dangerous to those who daily partake of beer in which it is used, by exhausting the nervous energy of

the stomach, and the sensibility and action of the heart. This subject is causing great excitement in London, and the brewers of bitter beer are upon the *qui vive*, assuring the public that the dangerous ingredient is unknown in their respective breweries.

The mortality in London continues very high; it is, however, we hope, abating. A little seasonable spring weather, and a cessation of the long continued east wind, would be very acceptable. However, in spite of the wind and the weather, our meadows and hedges are beginning to look beautifully green; spring flowers deck our gardens, and the lark, the blackbird, and the thrush make their accustomed haunts vocal with sweet music. Spring is constant in its return with buds and blossoms, and fair and sweet flowers and foliage, but man's nature knows no second spring, and the ordination is wise and kind.

THE QUEEN held the first drawing-room of the season last evening. Col. and Mrs. FREMONT and Mr. and Mrs. LAWRENCE were presented to Her Majesty by Mr. and Mrs. LAWRENCE. There is nothing new of importance from the Continent.

## FROM OUR PARIS CORRESPONDENT.

PARIS, APRIL 1, 1852.

Before proceeding to an account of the inauguration of the Legislative bodies and the discourse of the President, allow me to mention two or three other decrees.

On the 27th of March, "considering that the formation of the civil code promulgated by the Emperor Napoleon was due to his powerful will; considering that it was he who chose the eminent men who presented and finished that immortal work; that it was under his Presidency of the Council of State, and under the inspiration of his genius; that were resolved the most grave questions of the common law; that public gratitude has adorned this code with the title of *Code Napoleon*; and that, in re-establishing this name, we render homage as much to historical truth as to the national sentiment;" it was decreed that the civil code retain the name of "*Code Napoleon*."

No serious objection can be made to this decree, nor is it of great importance, but I mention it as a sign of the times, just as I mentioned the other day the forthcoming installation of eagles on the Pont Louis XVI, and as I may now mention the forthcoming restoration of eagles on the Pont d'Jena.

Another decree appoints seven new Senators, viz. the Duke of Mortemart, Gen. Petit, the Archbishop of Paris, Gen. Piat, M. Bineau, Minister of Finance; the Marquis of Barbançois, and Baron d'Heeckeren.

The appointment of the Archbishop of Paris is not so remarkable as his acceptance. Had he imitated the example of his friend, Gen. Cavaignac, and declined to form part of a Government based upon principles which he despises, he would certainly have acted a nobler part. On the other hand, it required some boldness on the part of Louis Napoleon to appoint him; for the Archbishop has the reputation of being both an honest man and a republican; but then the President's policy from the first has been to conciliate, not to stir up, the church.

The appointment of M. Barbançois was an act of civility towards the Legitimists—Baron Heeckeren is a personal friend of the Prince; and as for the appointment of the two Generals, the motive for that is plain as the Plains of Satory.

A decree of the 27th of March orders the sale of Orleans estates to the amount of 35,000,000f. (\$7,000,000). Among the estates to be thus alienated are those of Neuilly and Meudonville. The same decree also orders the alienation of the Castle of Rambouillet, of which more hereafter. The 35,000,000f. raised by the above sales is to be appropriated thus: ten millions to societies of mutual assistance; ten millions for the improvement of laborers' lodgings; ten millions for the encouragement of rural banks; and five millions towards a fund for the relief of the deserving poor. Another provision of the same decree orders the legion of honor, with an annuity of 500,000f. to be added to the national debt.

An important decree of the same date ordains the fusion of the Paris and Orleans, the Orleans and Bordeaux, the Tour and Nantes, and the Central Railroad Companies into one; a system of centralization which seems to be generally approved of, and which was long ago adopted, though not with the most striking success, in England.

A decree of the 26th of March restores the old law on clubs or associations. The penal code of France forbids the regular assembling of any association of more than twenty persons, for any object whatever, unless by consent of the Government, and under constitutions which it pleases to impose. Any violation of this law involves the dissolution of the association, and a fine imposed upon the chiefs and managers, varying from 100 to 1000. The person in whose house the assembly meets is liable to the same fine. The law of 1854 aggravates these provisions by forbidding any assembly whatever of more than twenty persons, even for a single time, without consent and direction of the Government, and subjects all the members of an assembly violating the law to a fine of from 50f. to 1,000f., doubles the fine in case of a second offence, and renders the offenders liable also to from two months to a year's imprisonment. Such is the law now re-enacted.

The last decree which I have room to allude to provides that "an edifice, destined to receive national expositions, and suitable for public ceremonies, and civil and military fetes, shall be constructed after the plan of the Crystal Palace of London, and erected in the grand square of the *Champs Elysees*. The project is confided to the Minister of the Interior, who is charged to "study the project and to propose to the President (who calls himself "us" in this instance) the most suitable means to arrive at a prompt and economical execution."

I come now to the installation of what are called the great bodies of the State. The ceremony took place on the 29th March, at the Palace of the Tuilleries, in the grand Hall of the Marshals. Of course the place was magnificently and imperially decorated, and nothing was spared to give the occasion every possible splendor and eclat. The platform provided for the President and other dignitaries was hung with a splendid canopy of red velvet, fringed with gold. On each side was a *troupee* of tricolor banners, surmounted with spread eagles. The canopy was immediately in front of the window which opens on to the famous "Balcony of the Clock," whence so often LOUIS PHILIPPE presented himself, with his royal family, before the people, as they stood near in admiring, now in scornful thousands, to gaze at him from the gardens of the Tuilleries. In the recess of the window seats were arranged for the President's military suite. A little in advance, and under the canopy, was not exactly the throne—but what else shall I call it?—of the Prince President. The papers call it a "large fauteuil of velvet and gold." At the right of this fauteuil, but "a step lower" in the elevation, was a smaller fauteuil for Marshal JEROME BONAPARTE, the President of the Senate. Behind these two *fauteuils* were ten chairs occupied by the Ministers. Near the window, at the right of the President, was a third fauteuil for the Vice President of the Council of State. The rest of the platform, which extended the whole length of the hall, was occupied by Councillors of State and Masters of Requests. The Deputies were in galleries at the extreme left. The distribution of the Senators, Prefects, and smaller dignitaries, and whether they sat in *fauteuils*, chairs, or benches, are incidents not worth mentioning. The *corps diplomatique* were on the side of the hall at the right of the President. At the bottom of the hall were editors of the Paris newspapers. The ambassadors were introduced by a dignitary just instituted, according to imperial usage, and who glories in the title of *Secrétaire des Ambassadeurs*. There not having been tailors and embroiderers enough in Paris to get all the State liveries ready for the occasion, about a fifth of the Deputies had to appear in what is called the *petite tenue*. Their *grande tenue* will probably be ready in time for the coronation. MONTAUBERT appeared in sober black, solem and knowing as a raven. The Cardinals were in full clerical costume. The President entered the hall at precisely one o'clock. His arrival was announced by the firing of cannon. On his entrance the brilliant company rose at once to their feet, but made little other demonstration. The President was escorted by his whole military house,

at the head of which was the Etat Major General of the National Guard.

Having taken his place, the President, after saluting the Assembly, invited the members to be seated, and then read the following address:

"The dictatorship which the people confided to me ceases to-day. Things are about to take their regular course. It is with a sentiment of real satisfaction that I come to proclaim here to-day that the Constitution is now in force; for my constant concern has been not only to re-establish order, but to render it permanent, by giving to France institutions suited to her wants. But a few months ago you will remember it—the more strictly I confined myself within the narrow circle of my prerogatives, the more persistent were the efforts to contract it still further, with a view to deprive me of all power of action. Often discouraged, I confess I thought of abandoning a power thus disputed. What restrained me was that I saw nothing could succeed me but anarchy. Every where, in fact, passions, eager to destroy, incapable of founding any thing were in a state of exaltation; and nowhere was there an institution or a man to whom one could cling; nowhere an undisputed right, an organization of any kind, or a practicable system.

"Thus when, thanks to the co-operation of certain courageous men—thanks, especially, to the energetic attitude of the army—all danger was dissipated in a few hours, my first care was to demand from the people new institutions. For too long a period society resembled a pyramid which had been overturned, and which it was sought to place upon its apex. I have replaced it upon its base. Universal suffrage, the only rightful source of power, at such a moment, immediately re-established; authority re-conquered its ascendancy; and finally, France, adopted the leading constitutional provisions which I submitted to her, I was enabled to create political bodies, the influence and consideration of which will be great in proportion as their prerogatives are wisely regulated. In fact, those political institutions, which can endure which define in an equitable manner the limits of the power of each, and which is no other way of arriving at a useful and beneficial application of liberty. Examples are at hand.

"Why, in 1814, did we see with satisfaction, notwithstanding our reverses, the inauguration of the parliamentary system? It was because the Emperor—let us not fear to avow it—had been drawn by war into a too absolute exercise of power.

"Why, on the other hand, in 1851, did France applaud the fall of this same regime? It was because the Chambers had been the influence which was given them, and that, wishing to re-establish every thing, they endangered the general equilibrium.

"Finally, why has not France been alarmed by the restrictions applied to the press and to individual liberty? It is that the one had degenerated into license, and the other, more have it, true, around the legislative urn all those party evolutions, keeping the ministry constantly in check, forcing it to be absorbed by one single care—that of its own defence—and ending, too often, only in the enervation of authority; but all the time which, as ministers or deputies, we should have given to this parliamentary system, we must now consecrate to business; serious practical business; this is our role under the Constitution. What it gives us is the voting of the tax, the discussion of the budget, and that of all the laws. It is not only the right to deliberate freely, publicly; to adopt, to reject; but it is also the right of amendment; no longer content with that facility of provision against which former Assemblies sought vainly to defend themselves, but with that maturity which is fatal only to utopias. In such prerogatives, believe me, there is a grand and valuable power. If, as I am sure, we use it sensibly, we shall have it, true, around the legislative urn all those party evolutions, keeping the ministry constantly in check, forcing it to be absorbed by one single care—that of its own defence—and ending, too often, only in the enervation of authority; but all the time which, as ministers or deputies, we should have given to this parliamentary system, we must now consecrate to business; serious practical business; this is our role under the Constitution. What it gives us is the voting of the tax, the discussion of the budget, and that of all the laws. 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